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Abstract: 
 
The emphasis in this paper will be on the illustration and explanation of the concepts and terminology 
defining the research framework within which the research programme was developed. Having 
crossed a somehow wide field, which ranges from two extremes which could be identified as 
“experience” and “experiment”, has prompted us to a reflection on the similarities and distinctions 
between these two terms and also on the dimensions among which this diversity is expressed.  
 
Research trajectory that started with the construction of a Role-Playing Game (RPG) to support local 
participatory decision-making about water management, continued with the development of an 
experimental protocol to test economic hypotheses exhibited by the RPG and developed into the 
analysis of the influence of context on players’ behaviour. RPG decomposition started from the 
definition of the concept of “context” that groups several informational dimensions: the game 
instructions; communication among players; and their involvement. In this presentation, only the two 
first dimensions are treated. They open perspectives to study the third one and the relations between 
these three attributes of the game context. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last decades, participatory or bargaining approaches emerged in resources management 
legislation. To develop these approaches, resource managers have to take into account the diversity 
of viewpoints in a population for building a shared problem representation, which could be difficult to 
reach. Decision-making tools are made to support these participatory processes and role playing 
games (RPG) are used to exhibit stakeholders objectives and constraints. It is difficult to assess RPG 
results, because the complexity of the field where they are conducted is reproduced in the protocol, 
and then they are not repeatable in an experimental way. 
 
This lack of repeatability for a RPG is the beginning of this study, which finally aims at understanding 
whether (and how) RPG could be a generic approach (i.e. a same tool for different field applications) 
and how RPG could be used complementarily with other decision-making tools. 
 
Research trajectory that started with the construction of a Role-Playing Game (RPG) to support local 
participatory decision-making about water management, continued with the development of an 
experimental protocol to test economic hypotheses exhibited by the RPG and developed into the 
analysis of the influence of context on players’ behaviour. 
 
Having crossed a somehow wide field, which ranges from two extremes which could be identified as 
“experience” and “experiment”, has prompted us to a reflection on the similarities and distinctions 
between these two terms and also on the dimensions among which this diversity is expressed. 
 
We believe that there is scope for some clarification, which is needed at least for two reasons: 
- on one side, there are a lot of works and different viewpoints about the so-called “participatory 
approach”, so that some cleaning would be welcome; 
- even more important, the terminology usually used in these works is not consistent across 
different disciplines. This fact emerged strikingly, for instance, during the meeting 
“Experimental Design for Resources Management Instruments” (Montpellier, 2008). Clearly, 
on issues like water management, which naturally involve the contribution of various 
disciplines, it is important to achieve a preliminary clarification on the different meanings that 
the same term displays. 
 
The emphasis in this paper will be on the illustration and explanation of the concepts and terminology 
defining the research framework within which our programme was developed, aiming at giving al least 
partial answers to the questions raised above. RPG decomposition started from the definition of the 
concept of “context” that groups several informational dimensions: the game instructions; 
communication among players; involvement. In this presentation, only the two first dimensions are 
treated. 
 
The text is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates and discusses the research framework, main 
terms and concepts. The research trajectory is described in Section 3. Section 4 concludes and 
provides the way forward of this research program. 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Claude Bernard (1865) distinguishes two kinds of sciences: observational and experimental ones. 
Observations and experiments are both investigations and reasoning made by scientists in order to 
improve scientific knowledge. According to Bernard, the main difference is that observations are 
comparisons made among natural phenomena while experiments are comparisons made on modified 
phenomena. Experimental facts are provoked by the experimenter who builds a protocol, by following 
preconceived ideas about expected results. Experimenters create this protocol in order to test 
theoretical hypotheses. He replicates it in order to gather data and, at the end of the experimental 
process, to compare the results. 
 
Bernard however moderates this separation among observation and experimentation. At the end of 
the process, experimental results are observed by the scientist. Then Bernard specifies that 
experiments are not strictly different with observations: experiments could be considered as provoked 
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observations. Therefore, observations could be seen as the central point in any scientific study, 
whatever the origin of the observed fact: natural or experimentally provoked. 
 
Bernard presentes what he considered to be the reasoning of a complete scientist: 
1) the scientist observes a fact 
2) according to this fact, an idea arises 
3) about this idea, the scientist reasons, builds an experiment, imagines and realizes the protocol 
4) from this experiment, new phenomena appear that the scientist has to observe, and so forth 
The following figure represents Bernard’s experimental reasoning scheme 
 
 
OBSERVATION OBSERVATION 
IDEAS 
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EXPERIMENTAL 
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REASONING 
INTERPRETATION 
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Figure 1 – Claude Bernard’s distinction between Observational and Experimental Sciences 
 
Bernard tries to define the terms “observation”, “experience” and “experiments” by comparing each 
other. He distinguishes experiment from experience, which have exactly the same translation in 
French by the word “EXPÉRIENCE”. According to him, experience gets the general sense of education 
acquired by life practicing, giving the word experiments (plural term) the sense of provoked facts that 
provide such education and knowledge. Bernard also distinguishes experience from observation. 
Observation is the basis for “mind which reasons”, while experience is the basis for “mind which 
concludes” at the end of the reasoning process initiated by observations. Therefore, experience could 
be obtained without doing experiment, particularly when experience is acquired after observing natural 
facts, as well as experiment could be conducted without improving experience when there is only 
observation of the results without comparison among observations and (in)validation of hypotheses. 
 
This specification proposed by Claude Bernard underlies the distinction we propose, made among 
experiments, experience and real life. We attempt to define the frontier between the three situations. It 
seems important to clarify the concepts and terms that back our research trajectory: what are the 
research questions driving our steps? What is the significance of an experience? In what an 
experiment differs from an experience? Why do we need to create an experimental environment? 
 
This section attempts to provide elements of clarification to the above questions and sets up a 
research framework within which our trajectory will then be positioned. 
 
We all make experiences in every day life. From experiences we learn how to behave through a 
“learning by doing” process. We learn, then we improve our knowledge, i.e. our experience. 
Experiences are therefore all kind of particular situations that we daily face and who participate to our 
experience improvement. The simple reproduction of a phenomenon can be considered as an 
(artificial) experience, as conditions are created ad hoc in order to allow perception and observation of 
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the “fact” (or the phenomenon) at least once. The observed phenomenon can also be measured 
through quantitative or qualitative analyses. Here is the frontier between real life and experience that 
Bernard has stressed: artificiality. 
 
A further and crucial step towards the formalization of knowledge was made through the capacity of 
replicating the same experience in a reasonably controlled environment. In any sciences, an 
experiment has three principles:  
1) It consists of setting-up a controlled environment in order to reproduce artificially theoretical 
conditions and parameters, 
2) It insures that the study can be replicated afterwards. 
3) It insures that the study can be repeated anywhere. 
 
These three principles are consistent with the goal of experiments, which are an attempt to reach 
verity, i.e. an attempt to understand and to know the laws underlying the phenomenon considered by 
the experimenter. 
 
These two characteristics (replication and control) represent the discriminatory criteria that transform 
an experience into an experiment. Even if they both participate in experience improvement, 
experiments are built in order to test hypotheses while experiences (natural or artificial uncontrolled 
situations) cannot be used to achieve this objective. Then, the “learning by testing” (i.e. experimental) 
process differs from the “learning by doing” (i.e. empirical) process by their methodology and 
objectives. While in experience the observer observes the “object”, i.e. the phenomenon, in 
experiment the experimenter observes the “observed object”, i.e. the object manipulated for the 
purpose of invalidating hypotheses. 
 
The possibility to control (as much as possible) in a laboratory the variables used to describe a 
phenomenon is essential to be able to replicate this phenomenon ad libitum and to always reach the 
same result We might therefore suggest that the real criterion of distinction between an experience 
and an experiment is control, as whether this is possible, replication comes as a consequence. In 
other terms, an experience can be reproduced, but not necessarily maintaining constant (or modified 
in a controlled way) its parameters. Therefore its outcomes cannot be compared one another. 
 
Summarising (Figure 2), we are not interested here in natural facts, but only in those that, after real life 
observations, are artificially reproduced, through the creation of artefacts or situations. Provoked 
conditions in social sciences are made through using table games, cards, or drama involving 
participants. These artificial environments allow people (those participating for instance in a game) to 
represent for themselves what happens, to interact each other and to measure the outcomes. 
 
Participants go therefore through a “learning by doing” process and improve their knowledge on the 
reproduced phenomenon. The difference between a “real life” (natural) situation and an artificial one 
consists in the fact that the latter was intentionally provoked through the construction of an artificial 
environment and that, for this reason, can be performed at any time, anywhere and with any 
participant. In social science, such an experience is usually a “tool to tell”, as its objective is to 
facilitate knowledge dissemination and people’s interactions. An experience can also be reproduced, 
but with no total control on the parameters backing the representation of the phenomenon at stake. 
When control is possible, then we cross the boundaries between an “artificial experience” and an 
experiment. Experiments are “tool to test” as they usually are constructed to test scientific 
hypotheses in a controlled environment and, through the replication of the same protocol, to verify 
statistically the robustness of results. 
 
The nature of data and information required to construct an artificial experience is substantially 
different from the one required for an experiment. As experiences are tools to tell, they tend to put 
participants into realistic situations as much as possible, by reproducing the environment by providing 
information (i.e. building the context). Through these experiences, participants would be facing the 
phenomenon at stake in their real life. Conversely, an experiment is a tool to test hypotheses and 
therefore the quantity of information (i.e. the level of context) required for its construction is very 
specific and related to the variables to control. 
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This information (i.e. the context) must be very precise and accurate on the aspects to be controlled 
and tested, but in order to reduce the elements of “noise”, it should be reduced to the minimum 
necessary to conduct the experiment.  
 
The following scheme (figure 2) represents the framework of the different concepts presented above. 
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Figure 2 – Real life, Experience and Experiment domains according to the criteria of 
observation, artificiality, control, and level of information 
 
Once the framework is defined, the different tools used by scientists from many disciplines that are 
involved in participatory approaches can be located along the frontiers. In participatory approaches, 
scientists could use tools like games, simulations or experiments. Each one has particular features, 
with advantages or limits according to the objective to be reached. Despite of this segregation among 
these three tools, experiments are however possible in gaming context when games are designed for 
a training purpose. Games could be conducted in an educational objective, and then are tools which 
follow strict rules and have definite objectives (cf. serious games, Michel 2009, Szilas and Sutter-
Widmer 2009). In participatory games, which have an exploratory goal, the range of actions is wide for 
players who are free in their decisions. Therefore, it is more difficult to generalize the results obtained 
in this kind of games. The question is therefore: is it possible, in such a game, to define elements of 
control of the game. 
3. RESEARCH TRAJECTORY 
Our research trajectory follows the “centripetal” arrow named “simplification” of the level of information 
contained in the tool. It first started with the construction of a RPG built to support local participatory 
decision-making about water management. It continued with the development of an experimental 
protocol to test economic hypotheses exhibited by the RPG and developed into the analysis of the 
influence of context on players’ behaviour. 
 
3-1) First step in protocol degradation : from KATAWARE to KATGAME 
 
A participatory RPG called KatAware (Farolfi and Rowntree, 2007) was developed within a project 
based on an approach called Companion Modelling (ComMod Group, 2003) to reproduce the 
functioning of a real catchment, the Kat River (South Africa), and allow local stakeholders (members of 
a Water User Association, WUA) to play around water management in order to : 
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- understand the complexity of the system; 
- understand the relations between agents; 
- understand the impact of different water allocation strategies on the water flows, the profits, 
employment and domestic users’ satisfaction; 
- build up a catchment strategy within the WUA. 
 
In some ComMod experiences, like the one in the Kat River, the researcher starts building a first 
preliminary MAS (Multi-Agent System) model to explicit the theoretical “pre-conceptions” (Farolfi and 
Rowntree, 2007). The confrontation of this first MAS model with the stakeholders allows revising and 
re-building it, taking into account the field situation and the stakeholders’ questions and remarks. This 
dynamic process leads to the construction either of a new MAS model derived from the previous one 
or a totally new one. Stakeholders learn collectively by creating, modifying and observing simulations 
(ComMod Group, 2003). RPGs are used in ComMod processes in order to facilitate stakeholders’ 
participation and understanding of the MAS models. Local stakeholders take part in the design 
process of an RPG. Therefore, it is impossible to repeat the same experience with others players in 
order to gather and analyse data. Rouchier (2006) stresses that the first and most obvious limit of 
ComMod RPGs is “the lack of accumulation of a knowledge that could be generalized to more than 
one situation”.  
 
During a RPG session many social phenomena may be observed and some can be seen as ‘exhibits’, 
consisting in empirical regularities for which, at the time, there are no well-developed theoretical 
explanations (Sugden, 2005). The two RPG sessions played during the experience in the Kat allowed 
observing cooperation among the different players in the use of the water available from the dam 
situated upstream the catchment. This observation suggested an attempt of comparison between the 
results obtained through one of the two RPG sessions and a Cooperative Game Theory model 
calibrated on the same data (Dinar et al., 2008). However, since there was no control of parameters in 
KatAware sessions, comparison between the two approaches (RPG outcomes and Cooperative Game 
Theory model) was impossible. Repetitions were therefore needed. Consequently, the idea (according 
to Bernard’s terminology) emerged to introduce control by building a “polished”, though still 
contextualized game derived from KatAware, to facilitate additional experiments in order to test 
cooperative behaviour of agents around water allocation and subsequent payoffs sharing. 
 
The resulting new set-up, based on KatAware and called KatGame, aimed at testing the Cooperative 
Game Theory hypotheses that lie behind these results. The following aspects were particularly 
targeted in our analysis:  
 
1) Players’ rationality (selfishness) and profit maximization;  
2) Players’ capacity to take advantage of the side payments in coalitions;  
3) Players’ behaviour in terms of resources (water, land) allocation within a coalition;  
4) Players’ choice to stay in partial coalitions or in a grand coalition; 
5) Allocation of coalition’s payoffs and comparison with the theoretical reference (e.g. the Shapley 
value2). 
(a) KatGame features 
In KatGame, many contextual features are derived from KatAware. Water is used for irrigation, 
domestic uses and ecological purposes. The subjects play the role of farmers. They have to make 
decisions implying the allocation of commonly owned water and the choice of cultivated areas. Payoffs 
are expressed in South-African Rands (ZAR). 
 
The game simulates a water resource management situation. Water is stored in a dam. Unlike 
KatAware, where 7 different roles were played, with farmers and village managers, KatGame involves 
only three farmers. This simplification is a first step in the degradation process. Degradation is a word 
used by modelists and we own it. In our case, "degradation" means simplification and "de-
contextualization" of the initial (and very complex) Role Playing Game, i.e. a proposition of a "coarser" 
or "poorer" representation of the experienced RPG situation, by identifying the main RPG features as 
a "core" of the game and by accepting to move away from the reality. 
                                                 
2 Shapley value is built upon the following hypotheses: efficiency, individual and group rationality and for each 
player, Shapley value is equal to the mean of his marginal contributions to all the coalitions in which he takes part 
(Parrachino et al 2006). 
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The cooperative structure with 3 players, as proposed in the KatAware model, remains. The entire 
hydrological model is removed in order to obtain the lab protocol. The choice of keeping 3 farmers is 
inherited from the Dinar et al.’s Cooperative Game Theory model, where only three players interact 
(each one representing one subcatchment: Upper, Middle and Downstream). The three farmers in 
KatGame are cabbage cultivators (whereas they were either cabbage or citrus cultivator in KatAware). 
They can require water from the dam to irrigate more area than their initial endowment. The game is a 
one-shot round, like the Dinar et al’s model, meaning that the farmers play only one period, 
corresponding to one year. 
 
The Cooperative Game Theory model with 3 players requires three coalitional situations: 1) singletons 
(each player is considered as one individual); 2) partial coalitions (two players group together) and 3) 
the grand coalition (the 3 players are part of the maximum level of coalition). Within coalitions, side-
payments are allowed. The side-payments theory is based on the assumption that “the coalitional 
utility function is expressed in units of a divisible commodity which stores utility, and which can be 
transferred without losses to the players” (Parrachino et al., 2006). Payoffs of a coalition can be 
divided among the members of the coalition in any possible way. As in “transferable-utility games” 
(Parrachino et al., 2006), it is possible to transfer money (i.e. the divisible commodity) among players 
in order to reallocate the profit gained through the coalition. This transfer represents the compensation 
that players of a coalition are ready to pay to one of them when this one accepts to leave to the others 
his own resource for a better valorisation. 
 
KatGame presents the same framework with the three phases. During the first phase, the three 
farmers play as singletons. They choose the area to cultivate and the corresponding water required 
without communication with the other farmers. During the second phase, two farmers play together in 
a partial coalition whilst the third farmer still plays alone. The partial coalition is presented to the 
farmers as an “informal group”. The farmers forming the partial coalition choose together the area 
cultivated by each one and the amount of water they required. At this stage, the two farmers involved 
in the partial coalition have to anticipate the water consumption of the third farmer (out of the coalition) 
who would be likely to require its maximum amount of water from the dam. The profit obtained by the 
partial coalition is common between the two farmers and side-payments3 are allowed. The second 
phase is composed of three independent rounds: 
 
Round 1: farmer 3 plays alone whilst farmers 1 and 2 play in a coalition. 
Round 2: farmer 2 plays alone whilst farmers 1 and 3 play in a coalition. 
Round 3: farmer 1 plays alone whilst farmers 2 and 3 play in a coalition. 
 
Finally, in the third phase, the three players play together in a grand coalition. The same cooperative 
principle as in the second phase with two farmers is generalized to the group including all the farmers. 
The grand coalition is presented to the players as an “irrigation board”, and consequently the farmers 
in the board manage collectively the water available from the dam.  
 
After having played the three phases, the players receive the results from each phase in terms of 
profit. On the basis of these results, they choose whether they prefer to be in a coalition or not and, if 
all the players want to be in the grand coalition, they are required to share the corresponding payoff. 
 
This game was tested in a classroom with students and with researchers in economics4. There was no 
visual separation among players. The room did not get the usual characteristics of an experimental lab 
which normally allows anonymity among players and control for the experimenter. Moreover, in some 
sessions, players were grouped into teams. In such a case, each team (composed by two persons) 
                                                 
3 The side-payments theory is based on the assumed assumption than “the coalitional utility function is expressed 
in units of a divisible commodity which stores utility, and which can be transferred without losses to the players”. If 
a coalition can obtain a total utility, this utility can be divided among the members of the coalition in any possible 
way. It is possible to transfer money among the players in order to reallocate the profit gained through the 
coalition. Such games satisfying these assumptions are called “transferable-utility games” (Parrachino I., Zara S., 
Patrone F. – 2006 - Cooperative Game Theory and its application to natural, environmental and Water resource 
issues: 1. Basic Theory, World Bank policy research working paper 4072).  
4 Two test sessions were conducted in Pretoria (South Africa), the first with students (12th of June 2007) and the 
second with researchers (18th of July 2007). These sessions provided some very important lessons to improve 
the protocol. 
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played the role of one farmer. Team building gave the possibility for experimenters to open 
discussions between players within a same team, in order to observe the negotiation process 
developed when making a decision, and then in order to capture more information about their 
behaviour. 
 
The following table summarizes the framework of the game. 
 
Common framework of the game 
Phase Name Round Description 
1 SINGLETONS   Farmers 1, 2 and 3 played alone 
1 Farmers 1 and 2 played together; Farmer 3 played alone 
2 Farmers 1 and 3 played together;  Farmer 2 played alone 2 PARTIAL COALITIONS 
3 Farmers 2 and 3 played together;  Farmer 1 played alone 
3 GRAND COALITION   Farmers 1, 2 and 3 played together 
Table 1- KatGame framework 
(b) General observations and lessons 
The Cooperative Game Theory model makes the assumption of players rationality, who are profit 
takers5. By comparing the results of the test session with the theoretical results obtained through the 
model, it can be observed that in some versions of KatGame, unlike in the theoretical model, the result 
is not super-additive6. Complexity of the water allocation rules could explain why players did not play 
“rationally”, as expected in the Cooperative Game Theory model. This point is central for the next step, 
when running experiments in a lab. 
 
The protocol was not completely definite to be conducted in an experimental environment. Some 
context aspects remain to be simplified. Firstly, the duration and the high complexity level of the game 
does not allow many repetitions during one session, being a strong barrier decreasing data gathering 
possibility. Secondly, the experimenter has a strong role in the design of water allocation rules, while 
in experimental environment experimenter has to be as neutral as possible. As water allocation rules 
depend on the experimenter intervention in KatGame, comparisons among sessions are impossible. 
Thirdly, coalition formation impacts on the payoff structure (that could be “non super-additive”, as 
stated above). Each group of 3 players can obtain different outcomes, and then the results can not be 
compared “ceteris paribus” (in that case, payoff structure changes among groups and sessions), being 
also a constraint in data gathering. These three limits of KatGame inhibit any test of hypotheses, 
requiring the design of a new tool: KatLab. 
 
3-2) Second step in protocol degradation : from KATGAME to KATLAB 
 
KatGame had still the characteristics of a partially contextualized RPG, and is considered as an 
experience rather than an experiment. KatGame had several phases to be played (singleton, partial 
coalition and grand coalition) in order to build the payoff framework. This made replication and control 
difficult and suggested to simplify further the protocol. KatLab was then constructed to be conducted in 
a laboratory. KatLab corresponds to a second step in the simplification of the level of information. It 
was built in order to cross the boundary between experience and experiment, by focusing on the main 
discriminatory characteristic: control of parameters. 
 
KatLab consists of a “one shot” game, where three players are given the results of a super-additive 
Cooperative Game Theory set-up. They choose 1) whether or not to stay in the grand coalition and 2) 
if they have chosen to stay within the grand coalition, the distribution among them of the payoff. This 
                                                 
5 The participants did not receive monetary rewards at the end of the test. 
6 Let N be a finite set of n players in a transferable utility game. Let S and T be subsets of N (S and T are 
coalitions). Let v be a real-valued function defined over all the subsets of N. In the present experiment, v is the 
payoff obtained. 
A transferable-utility game is super-additive if for all S, T included in N, with S ∩ T=Ø 
v(S U T) ≥ v(S) + v(T) 
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distribution (chosen by the players) is then compared with the theoretical reference provided by the 
Shapley value. 
 
The initial objective remains, i.e. the test of Cooperative Game Theory hypotheses, with a new 
question that has arisen after the design of KatGame. The context simplification of KatGame, 
according to the willingness to control parameters and to import the game from the field to the lab, 
made central the following questions: what are the main characteristics of the context in any game? 
Once the main characteristics are identified, what are the influences of each one on players’ 
behaviour? Could the scientist give prominence to a “game core”, i.e. a minimalist structure that can 
not be modified without changing the whole nature of the game? 
(a) Context and Information 
Experimental economists answer that the minimalist structure of the game has to be as simple as 
possible, with abstract protocols and instructions, in order to control all the parameters (Binmore 2001, 
Eber and Willinger 2005). The philosophy could be resumed to the following sentence: the lower the 
number of parameters involved in the game, the more efficient is the control. Moreover, as 
experiments are built in order to test hypotheses derived from theory (or from a preconceived idea, 
using Bernard’s terminology), and since theory is universal and described in absolutely abstract terms, 
then abstract protocols provide the possibility to test hypotheses in “theoretical conditions”. 
 
However, Sugden (2005) stressed that from the beginning, experimenters have been criticized for their 
methodology, and more particularly for the ‘artificiality’ of the laboratory experiments, unlike field 
experiments, which are more concrete. Laboratory environments exclude features of the world that are 
crucial for the workings of real economic institutions. Abstract context of experimental tasks removes 
cues that, in the field, help people to orient themselves, and the social norms that guide interaction in 
the field are not adequately reproduced in the laboratory. In spite of the experimental economics 
methodological requirement, context is then introduced by scientists in protocols. This context 
introduction is motivated by different objectives (or needs): 
♦ Evaluation of context impact on agents’ behaviour.  
♦ Willingness to be closer to the players’ reality by introducing context cues. 
♦ Willingness to make the actions at stake in the game more complex, while abstract instructions 
does not allow “fun” tasks. 
♦ Context gives legitimacy to the game and allows appropriation by the players (when 
stakeholders) by facing realistic situations. 
By introducing context, the experimenter seeks to go toward realism or tries to introduce a kind of 
control on players understanding and motivation that he loses when tasks are too abstract. 
 
Harrison and List (2004) describe an auction experiment in which agents tend to pay goods they buy 
at a higher level than expected by auction theory. They speak about “winner’s curse”. This deviation 
from theoretical predictions disappears if the experiment is conducted with experienced agents 
(traders). Harrison and List define the notion of “context-specific experience”. They conclude that the 
highlight of the winner's curse phenomenon in student sample (without “auction-specific-experience”) 
has not to be generalized out of this specific situation, because context influences behaviour by itself. 
Therefore, this result stresses that when studying behaviours, context has not to be totally removed, 
rather it has to be understood. 
 
Harrison and List (2004) stated a classification of experiments according to the context level 
introduced in the protocol. They distinguish: 
♦ Conventional lab experiment that is the classical experiment used in experimental economics, 
basic level, in which protocols and instructions are abstract, run in a lab, with students.  
♦ Artefactual field experiment, which is a first contextualized level, keeping some Conventional lab 
experiment features: protocol and instructions remain abstract, but are not run in the lab with 
students. It takes place in the field with local stakeholders.  
♦ Framed field experiments that are played in the field, with stakeholders, like an Artefactual field 
experiment, but protocol and instructions are contextualized. 
♦ Natural field experiment. Agents are observed in their natural environment without realizing that 
they are participating to an experiment. 
 
At this point, the question is to define what is the context of a game. We could define the context in 
terms of information: quantity but also quality of this information, characterized by: 
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» information hold by the agents ("past life", or experience), or informational storage, 
» information provided to the agents in the game instructions, or informational flow from the 
experimenter to the agents, 
» information exchanged among agents through communication, or informational sharing, 
depending on the media features, and based on the information contained within the 
instructions. 
 
While experimenters have a full control on information provided by the instructions, they cannot fully 
manage nor the information hold by the agents neither the one exchanged among them (when 
communication is allowed). Agents’ experience could be interpreted as a prism, which deviates initial 
information flow sent by the experimenter through the instructions. Each agent has her own prism, and 
then the same initial information contained within the instructions could provoke different 
interpretations. By reducing the quantity of information in game instructions, and by controlling its 
quality, experimenters limit agents’ experience interference in the results. Heterogeneity of behaviours 
derived from different interpretations of a same context is then managed. 
 
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997) propose a representation of information hold by agents. According to 
their model, knowledge is a database which stores the history of the whole situations lived in the past. 
Within his personal database (represented by a matrix), each agent selects the situations (i.e. the 
vectors) which are similar to the situation the agent is facing. In front of each situation, the agent acts, 
and each action produces a result. The agent chooses the action which has led to the best result in 
similar situations lived in the past.  
 
Context introduction in economic protocol can create heterogeneity in players’ behaviour if compared 
with conventional lab experiment results, conducted with abstract protocols (Velez et al. 2009). 
However, Harrison and List’s concept of “context-specific-experience” stresses the existence of some 
homogeneity of behaviours in front of context cues. By running the game with stakeholders from the 
same field, who usually face the same situations and have the same perception of simulated situations 
which reproduce their everyday life, this heterogeneity in behaviour is limited. Information provided by 
the experimenter is deviated by similar prisms. 
 
The decomposition of the context in a protocol (as a quantity and a quality of information) leads to 
identify four elementary attributes: 
 
1. The first attribute "INSTRUCTIONS" is the level of information provided by the instructions. The 
influence of this information (when they are present within the instructions) is usually treated in the 
literature under the name of "framing effect" (Tversky and Kahnemann 1981, Wang 1996, Eber and 
Willinger 2005, Kuhberger and Tanner 2010). 
 
2. The second attribute "COMMUNICATION" considers the fact that the players can exchange 
information about the instructions, using a media (via face-to-face communication around a table, or 
through computerized exchange), and then the players modify their understanding of the game 
(Cardenas 2003, Carpenter et al. 2004, Ostrom 2006). This essential attribute in RPG can be strictly 
controlled in a laboratory. The lower level of information for this attribute is obtained in laboratory, by 
locating players in boxes, without any possibility neither to see each other nor to speak together. 
Under this condition, the observation of the outcome obtained at the end of each period is the only 
way of communication among players (when players are grouped and when the outcome depends on 
the group members’ behaviour). 
 
3. The third attribute "PERIODICITY" takes into account periods repetition, which participates to the 
learning process (i.e. information acquisition) about the game by the players. By accumulating 
information on other players’ behaviour, one player could modify his own behaviour all along the game 
repetition (Eber and Willinger 2005). The one-shot game provides the lower level of information 
through learning process. By repeating identically several times the exactly same periods or by 
building dynamic games (i.e. situation of the game at period n depends on the results obtained during 
the previous period n-1), players can store information and then they can improve their experience. 
 
4. Finally, the fourth attribute "PLAYERS" considers the level of information brought by the 
participants when coming into the game. Players’ experience (i.e. the information hold, or already 
acquired in “similar” past situations) and involvement conditions the interpretation made by the players 
 10
Colloque OPDE 2010 INRA Montpellier « Aide à la décision et gouvernance » 
 
about the information provided in the three other contextual attributes. Experience has an impact on 
behaviour (Selten 1988, Gilboa and Schmeidler 1997, Harrison and List 2004, Eber and Willinger 
2005, Brañas Garza 2006). 
 
Each attribute participates to the complexity of the game (cf. figure 3). The experimental methodology 
allows a control of each attribute in order to assess the influence of each one on agents’ behaviour. 
We make the hypothesis that an experiment can have different levels of contextualization (Wang 
1996). The influence of each contextual attribute has to be tested separately, by isolating each one 
from the others. By considering a game in its minimal level of contextualization, more complexity could 
be obtained by changing some features of each contextual attribute of the game. Comparison of 
results from playing the different versions (with different context levels) of Kat Lab is likely to provide 
elements of response to the research questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Game features: level of complexification
Information level: 
experience, players’ 
interpretation 
 
PLAYERS 
Information level: 
accumulated along the 
experiment 
 
PERIODICITY 
Information level: 
exchanged among 
players 
 
COMMUNICATION 
Information level:  
Provided by 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Cardenas 2003 Tversky & 
Kahneman 1981 
 Eber & Willinger 
2005 
Gilboa Schmeidler 1997 
 
Ostrom 2006  Ostrom 2006 
Wang 1996  
 
Figure 3 – Decomposition of context on few basic components (attributes) 
 
Each attribute will be tested, keeping constant the 3 others, in order to assess its impact on 
behaviours. Context in “instructions” is tested first, in constant conditions in term of communication 
(not allowed), periodicity (15 periods), with students. Secondly, “communication” is tested, keeping 
constant the context in instructions (abstract), periodicity (15 periods), with students. 
(b) KatLab features 
The problem treated is based on KatGame context (itself resulting from the degradation of KatAware 
context). It concerns the allocation among users of a resource that we shall identify (in the more 
contextualized version of KatLab instructions) as available water stored in a dam. To handle this 
problem, we take as a reference the results of Cooperative Game Theory with transferable utility, as 
used from the beginning of the degradation process. 
 
Within the group of 3 players, various situations are possible, as indicated in table 2 below: 
 
Each member of the group remains independent 
Player A earns  75 000 ecus 
Player B earns 100 000 ecus 
Player C earns 200 000 ecus 
The players A and B join together A-B association earns 175 000 ecus 
Player C earns 200 000 ecus 
The players A and C join together A-C association earns 275 000 ecus 
Player B earns 100 000 ecus 
The players B and C join together B-C association earns 350 000 ecus 
Player A earns 75 000 ecus 
The 3 members of the group join together A-B-C association earns 500 000 ecus 
Table 2 – KatLab frameword. 
 
We suppose that the grand coalition is automatically formed (while in KatGame, the players were 
placed in all coalitional situations). In order to simplify the game, the intermediate situations (i.e. the 
partial coalitions) are not possible. Then automatically at the beginning of each period, the 3 players 
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play together within the grand coalition. Information related to partial coalitions is given only for mutual 
knowledge. The instructions ignore the term "coalition" to whom we refer as "association" or "group". 
 
To facilitate the playability of the experiment, various choices for the grand coalition payoff sharing (i.e. 
the 500 000 ecus) are proposed through cards. At each period, the players have to choose among the 
7 following propositions: 
 
 Card 1 Card 2 Card 3 Card 4 Card 5 Card 6 Card 7 
Player A 498 000 117 000 1 000 100 000 166 666 1 000 75 000 
Player B 1 000 142 000 1 000 150 000 166 666 498 000 100 000 
Player C 1 000 241 000 498 000 250 000 166 666 1 000 200 000 
Table 3 – The cards proposed to the players. 
 
Cards 1 to 6 are based on different sharing rules for the grand coalition payoff (500 000 ecus): 
- according to the Shapley value, in card 4. 
- equalitarian (each player receives exactly the same amount), in card 5 
- selfish (based on ultimatum game predictions), in cards 1, 3 and 6 
- equalitarian sharing of the surplus7, in card 2 
 
Card 7 does not propose a grand coalition payoff sharing. It is the status quo card, letting the choice to 
the players to not participate to the grand coalition and then to remain independent. Thus the choice of 
card 7 is the non-cooperation choice. 
 
All the players play simultaneously every period and take only one decision: each player of the group 
chooses only one card. If the 3 players choose the same card, they receive the amount indicated on 
the card. If there is no coordinated answer on the same card, they receive the values obtained as 
singletons (reminded in card 7). 
 
A session is comprised of 15 identical periods. At the end of each period, the individual choices and 
the card "solution" which fixes the individual earnings are shown in the screen of the 3 players of the 
group (but not the results of the other groups), before beginning the next period. The players learn 
during the successive sessions the preferences of the other players in their group. This can facilitate 
the research of a coordination on an allocation (i.e. on a card) 
 
Six treatments were built. One session was played by treatment. There are 6 treatments, thus 18  6 
participants = 108 subjects were mobilized for the experiment. The 18 players who participated to a 
session were distributed into 6 groups of 3 players (the group composition remained fixed for all the 
session). We obtain 6 groups of independent data per session (and also per treatment). Players 
participated only to one session and thus played only one treatment ("between subject" procedure). 
They were paid in euros (€) at the end of the session according to their performance, which depends 
on the choices they have made throughout the game. 
 
The participants were chosen in a base of "subjects" supplied by the Experimental Economics 
Laboratory from Montpellier (L.E.E.M ). The students (Bachelor’s degree) who are registered in the 
base came from the different universities of Montpellier. We consider that students’ samples are 
homogeneous (Eber and Willinger 2005) and composed by subjects with same experience about the 
context we are studying. 
 
The abstract treatment (treatment 0.0) only asks the players to choose among the seven cards the 
one which is closest to the favourite allocation, for themselves and for their partners within their group 
of 3 players. For the five other contextualized treatments, the protocol basis is exactly identical. The 
difference is situated at the level of the instructions, to which additional information is added, firstly 
within the instructions, at different levels, and secondly by allowing communication. 
 
                                                 
7 v(A) + v(B) + v(C) = 375 000 ecus ; v(ABC) = 500 000 ecus ; the surplus of the grand coalition with respect the 
singletons is S = 500 000 – 375 000 = 125 000 ecus, equally shared among the 3 players, i.e. 41 666 ecus for 
each one, added to the singleton payoff, that is v(A) + 41 666 = 116 666 ecus rounded to 117 000 ecus for player 
A, v(B) + 41 666 = 141 666 ecus rounded to 142 000 ecus for player B and v(C) + 41 666 = 241 666 ecus 
rounded to 241 000 ecus for player C. 
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Instructions  
Abstract 
Water : 
sentence 
only 
Water : 
farmers 
« no-Water » : 
salaries 
Without Treatment 0.0 Treatment 0.1 Treatment 0.2 Treatment 0.3Communication With  Treatment 1.0  Treatment 1.2  
Table 4 – Number correspondence for each treatment 
 
Instructions at treatment 0.1 contain only one additional sentence when compared with instructions at 
treatment 0.0: "the experiment is articulated around a water management issue". 
 
Instructions at treatment 0.2 have a more important level of contextualization. The explanation of the 
sentence introduced in treatment 0.1 is provided. Players know that they are farmers who irrigate their 
superficies. Their environment reminds the KatGame (and KatAware) context, under degraded shape, 
with presence of a dam and the possibility to form coalitions in order to optimise the stored water uses. 
The asymmetric roles of players A, B and C are explained by differences of specific production 
functions for three different types of farmers. 
 
Treatment 0.3 has the same level of contextualization than treatment 0.2, but refers to a firm 
organization context. Players are described as salaried employees, who have possibility to cooperate 
in order to optimise their earnings. The asymmetric roles of players A, B and C are explained by 
efficiency differences related to their “seniority” and experience. 
 
The context gradation between treatments 0.0, 0.1 and 0.2 allows us to measure the impact of water 
evocation within the instructions (via the “intermediate” treatment 0.1), and to measure the influence 
on players’ behaviour of the information provided in the instructions (via treatment 0.2). Treatment 0.3 
is a comparison session, in order to assess the influence of water evocation on behaviour, by contrast 
with another context chosen out of renewable resource management references. 
(c) KatLab results 
KatLab is built to provide elements of response to understand the influence of contextual game 
attributes on behaviour, focusing on water context impact. Five hypotheses are tested to answer this 
question. 
 
(H1). Grand Coalition payoff sharing according the Shapley value is the majority choice 
 
(H2). Information addition within instructions induces a “noise” on players’ perception and on their 
behaviour, which is observable through the results: choices are concentrated on the same card 
in treatment 0.0 while choices are dispersed on several cards in treatment 0.2 
 
(H3). Water context induces better coordination than other contexts 
 
(H4). Communication allows the players a better coordination, and then more cooperation among 
players 
 
(H5). Communication reduces the “noise” in the results 
 
The evaluation of attributes influence on behaviour needs isolation and variation of each one, keeping 
constant the others. This section is organized by presenting the sequential attributes variations: 1) 
instructions effect, with communication at the lower (and controlled) level; 2) communication effect, 
with instructions at the lower (and controlled) level; 3) instructions effect, with communication attribute 
at the highest contextual level, and; 4) the evaluation of water evocation by comparison with “no-
water” context in instructions. 
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i. Instructions effect, without communication 
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Group results (90 observations) 
Card number 7 1 3 6 5 2 4 
Treatment 0.0 39 0 0 0 39 5 7 
Treatment 0.2 48 0 0 0 12 23 7  
Players’ choices (270 observations) 
Card number 7 1 3 6 5 2 4 
Treatment 0.0 2 3 4 3 163 41 54 
Treatment 0.2 9 9 2 1 90 92 67  
Card 5 appears far fewer at treatment 0.2 if compared with 
treatment 0.0. 
The majority choice is focused on card 5 at treatment 0.0, 
invalidating hypothesis H1 which anticipated a majority choice 
on card 4. 
At treatment 0.2, choices on cards 2, 4 and 5 are somehow 
closed, without significant differences. “Water” context 
introduction is a noise for the players (students): hypothesis 
H2 is not invalidated. 
               reat t . Treat
   Treatm 0             Tent 0. reatment 0.2
 
 
 
ii. Communication effect, with abstract instructions 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Traitement 0.0 Traitement 1.0
Carte 4
Carte 2
Carte 5
Carte 6
Carte 3
Carte 1
Carte 7
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Traitement 0.0 Traitement 1.0
Carte 4
Carte 2
Carte 5
Carte 6
Carte 3
Carte 1
Carte 7
 
Group results (90 observations) 
Card number 7 1 3 6 5 2 4 
Treatment 0.0 39 0 0 0 39 5 7 
Treatment 1.0 48 2 2 3 3 13 19  
Players’ choices (270 observations) 
Card number 7 1 3 6 5 2 4 
Treatment 0.0 2 3 4 3 163 41 54 
Treatment 1.0 0 18 11 14 53 47 127 
Card 7 appears more frequently at treatment 1.0 than at 
treatment 0.0, invalidating hypothesis H4 which states that 
communication improves coordination and then cooperation. 
Extreme cards, which are not observed in the results at 
treatment 0.0, appear at treatment 1.0. 
Card 4 is the majority choice at treatment 1.0 (with 
communication), but at a same level as card 5 at treatment 0.0 
(without communication). Communication removes the focal 
point (from card 5 to card 4), but does not reduce the noise, 
invalidating hypothesis H5. 
 
 
 
 
   T                    T                re tment 0.   eat ent 1.0reatment 0.0  Treat ent 1.0
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iii. Instructions effect, with communication 
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Group results (90 observations) 
Card number 7 1 3 6 5 2 4 
Treatment 1.0 48 2 2 3 3 13 19 
Treatment 1.2 52 3 3 1 0 10 21  
Players’ choices (270 observations) 
Card number 7 1 3 6 5 2 4 
Treatment 1.0 0 18 11 14 53 47 127 
Treatment 1.2 0 18 15 13 38 85 101  
There is no significant difference in the results and the choices.  
Communication, in this coordination game, has a stronger effect on players than instructions effect (water: farmers), to such an 
extent that instructions effect disappears. 
This observation has to be contrasted with results of experiments conducted later with farmers, who would have to be more 
sensitive to water context than students had been in this experiment. 
 
 
 
iv. Water vs no-Water 
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Group results (90 observations) 
Card number 7 1 3 6 5 2 4 
Treatment 0.2 48 0 0 0 12 23 7 
Treatment 0.3 24 0 0 0 13 45 8  
Players’ choices (270 observations) 
Card number 7 1 3 6 5 2 4 
Treatment 0.2 9 9 2 1 90 92 67 
Treatment 0.3 0 0 1 1 72 159 37  
Same frequency for cards 4 and 5 at both treatments, while 
frequency of emergence for card 2 is double at treatment 0.3. 
Coordination, valuated by frequency of emergence for card 7, 
is better at treatment 0.3 (“no-water”), invalidating hypothesis 
H3. 
“No-water” context seems to provide the players (students) a 
common representation, with a focal point on card 2. This 
common representation could explain the better coordination 
at treatment 0.3 than at treatment 0.2. 
This result has to be contrasted with the one of experiments 
conducted with farmers in the field. 
                   Treatment 0.0   Treatment 1.2
   Treatment 0.0                 Treatment 1.2
   Treatment 0.2                 Treatment 0.3
   T                 reatment 0.2  Treatment 0.3
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4. CONCLUSION 
The interest of this paper consists in the attempt to provide a first conceptual framework within which 
the various steps of the research trajectory could be identified. The definition and clarification of 
concepts and terms required for the construction of the framework might be useful to produce at term 
a common basis for researchers involved in social experiences and experiments in the field of 
common pool resources management. 
 
Our research trajectory can be introduced in this conceptual framework as indicated in figure 4. 
KatAware was a RPG developed and played with local stakeholders in order to enhance their 
knowledge and facilitate discussions about water allocation strategies. The objective of KatAware was 
to create an artificial environment similar to the real one and allow participants making a common 
experience about water management. The willingness to test Cooperative Game Theory hypotheses 
emerged from the observation of KatAware results conducted the research team to develop KatGame, 
a contextualized protocol derived from KatAware. Due to its complexity and still high level of 
contextualization, KatGame proved difficult in terms of replication and control. KatLab was therefore 
constructed as an extremely simplified protocol derived from KatGame and aimed at controlling all 
variables of the experiment in the laboratory and replicating it as much as required in order to get 
statistically verifiable results.  
 
 
 
 
Real Life 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Our research trajectory within the proposed conceptual framework 
 
It is interesting to observe that the objectives of the three tools (KatAware, KatGame and KatLab) are 
different and reflect the evolution of the research questions emerged all along the programme: 
KatAware was a RPG aimed at improving stakeholders’ knowledge and negotiations; KatGame was a 
first attempt to simplify the RPG into a laboratory tool to test hypotheses emerged during the RPG 
sessions and previously formalised into a Cooperative Game Theory model; KatLab is a further step 
into the experimental environment, the protocol is extremely simplified and does not only aim to test 
economic hypotheses, but also (and rather) to understand the impact of context into players’ 
behaviour by comparing results of sessions played in the abstract set-up (treatment 0.0) with results of 
sessions played in contextualized ones. 
 
Experience 
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Representation 
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Information 
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Answering this question can have heavy consequences in the near future on the development of tools 
to facilitate stakeholders’ water governance and common decision-making. The study of the influence 
of context may allow understanding whether the management of the commons requires dedicated 
protocols or, conversely, a “universal” and generic protocol exists. If protocols about the management 
of the commons (e.g. water) can be de-contextualized, then standard methods could be transferred 
from one place to another and at different times. Conversely, results could show that methods are 
strictly dependent from the issue at stake. But whatever the conclusions arose at this stage, results 
are obtained with students whereas the tools we want to improve involve stakeholders. Therefore, 
after having tested the attributes “Instructions” and “Communication”, the attribute “Players” has to be 
studied, in the field, by using a new protocol version. This protocol is named KatField, and will be 
composed by the same 6 treatments than KatLab. 
 
Until this stage, the research trajectory remained centripetal. The transition from KatLab to KatField is 
a new (reverse) direction, as Harrison and List (2004) have already proposed, starting from a 
conventional lab experiment to a framed field experiment through an transitive step: the artefactual 
experiment. By comparison with Harrison and List’s approach (cf. figure 5), we also start from a 
conventional lab experiment (KatLab, treatment 0.0) but the artefactual experiment (i.e. the 5 other 
KatLab treatments) does not remain abstract in term of instructions and is not conducted in the field 
with stakeholders as Harrison and List’s one. Rather, the artefactual experiment is developed in the 
lab with students in order to maintain control when testing contextualization influence. Once this 
influence evaluated, the protocol is transferred to the field, leading to the framed field experiment 
(KatField) with same characteristics as Harrison and List’s one. The originality consists of passing by a 
different transitive step between the conventional lab experiment and the field experiment. The final 
point of this reversal trajectory (centrifugal, cf. figure 4) could meet the initial point, i.e. a return to a 
RPG design, starting from the field experiment outcomes. 
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Figure 5 – Comparison between two different transition from the lab to the field 
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